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ABSTRACT
Randomness is a necessary ingredient in various computa-
tional tasks and especially in Cryptography, yet many ex-
isting mechanisms for obtaining randomness suer from nu-
merous problems. We suggest utilizing the behavior of hu-
mans while playing competitive games as an entropy source,
in order to enhance the quality of the randomness in the
system. This idea has two motivations: (i) results in experi-
mental psychology indicate that humans are able to behave
quite randomly when engaged in competitive games in which
a mixed strategy is optimal, and (ii) people have an aec-
tion for games, and this leads to longer play yielding more
entropy overall. While the resulting strings are not perfectly
random, we show how to integrate such a game into a robust
pseudo-random generator that enjoys backward andforward
security.
We construct a game suitable for randomness extraction,
and test users playing patterns. The results show that in
less than two minutes a human can generate 128 bits that
are 2
 64-close to random, even on a limited computer such
as a PDA that might have no other entropy source.
As proof of concept, we supply a complete working soft-
ware for a robust PRG. It generates random sequences based
solely on human game play, and thus does not depend on
the Operating System or any external factor.
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 The Importance of Being Random
Randomness is essential for addressing the main problems
of Cryptography (encryption, identication and authentica-
tion)
1, and it is also used in various other elds of Computer
Research Supported by the Israel Science Foundation
yIncumbent of the Judith Kleeman Professorial Chair.
1The assumption under Kirchho's law is that the system
is known to the adversary and the key is the only unknown
parameter. Hence any deterministic computation by the
parties can be simulated by the adversary.
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Science (see for example [1], [2], [3]) as well as other sciences
(see [4]). When designing random algorithms and crypto-
graphic systems, the availability of a source of pure random-
ness is assumed, but such perfect sources of randomness are
not readily available. To overcome this in applications the
common approach is to nd a source assumed to be of high
min-entropy (see Denition 2.1), or at least unpredictable
from the point of view of an adversary, and then extract a
uniform (or close to uniform) sequence from it (see Section
2.1 for more about randomness extraction). This random-
ness source usually consists of a combination of information
assumed to be unknown to an adversary (e.g. components
manufacturer ID) combined with information assumed to
be dicult to predict (e.g. exact system time or mouse po-
sition/movement).
While in principle this is a good approach, the implemen-
tation of such an extraction method is often problematic.
Ferrenberg et al. demonstrated how certain choices of such
an extraction procedure could lead to correlated sequences,
eventually resulting in a random algorithm giving wrong
results [5]. Early on in the history of the web, Goldberg
and Wagner attacked Netscape's implementation of the SSL
protocol, basing their attack on its entropy sources and re-
fresh rate [6]. Even more than a decade later, security vul-
nerabilities are still found in Pseudo-Random Generators:
Gutterman, Pinkas and Reinman found weaknesses in the
Linux Pseudo-Random Generator entropy collection stage
in 2006 [7], and a bug in the Pseudo Random Generator of
the Debian Linux Operating System (including the popular
Ubuntu Linux distribution) caused the generated crypto-
graphic keys to be insecure, since they relied on very little
entropy (process id). Shacham and Enright showed that, in
fact, a large number of keys generated during this period are
highly predictable [8]. Alarmingly, this bug was only discov-
ered in May 2008, two years after being introduced into the
system [9].
These problems and pitfalls in Pseudo-Random Genera-
tion call for careful improvements in the design of such sys-
tems, and for better sources of entropy to be utilized.
1.2 Entropy Gathering
Systems that exist today utilize one or more out of three
entropy collections methods:
1. Direct Gathering: the user is requested to hit the
keyboard or wiggle the mouse randomly for a period of
time. PGP is a well known example of direct entropy
request [10]. The main problem with this method is
that humans click the keyboard or move the mouse in
1relatively predictable patterns (for example, see about
timing attacks in [11] - similar methods can be used
to predict entropy gathered). Even worse, the casual
user bored with requests for entropy might perform
very similar patterns every time they are prompted,
potentially leading to a predictable result.
2. Background Gathering: the system constantly col-
lects entropy from \least-signicant data" - usage pat-
terns of the mouse, keyboard, hard disk, etc. This
method is very popular and is used in the Linux and
Windows based systems [12] [13]. A problem with
this solution is that it constantly spends resources on
this collection. More disturbingly, the usage patterns
might be predictable, for instance if the adversary con-
vinces the user to perform certain tasks, or if the sys-
tem is not directly used for a long period of time. Also,
this method is not feasible when dealing with simple
systems such as PDAs (Personal Digital Assistants, i.e.
relatively weak handheld computers), that don't have
a keyboard or hard disk or in systems that are not
frequently used for periods of times.
3. Hardware Gathering: the system observes chaotic
systems such as cloud patterns, electrical circuits, at-
mospheric noise and even Lava lamps [16] [17] [18].
Such systems have large overhead, are physically com-
plex and therefore expensive to create and maintain.
Also, it is relatively easy to interfere with the results,
either by mistake of the user or by an adversary. The
camera could be faced towards the wall, the lava lamp
could be disconnected, and so on. In addition, the
adversary may be able to observe the same system in-
dependently of the user and predict much of their en-
tropy, and there is always the danger of temporary pre-
dictable behavior: Cloudless days, strong radio trans-
missions that dominate atmospheric noise, etc.
1.3 Humans and Randomness
The ability of humans to choose randomly has been ex-
tensively studied in Experimental Psychology (see [19] for
a historical survey). It has been generally accepted that
sequences and numbers generated by humans are far from
being truly random
2. Common biases of randomness recog-
nition such as the \Hot Hand" (tendency to believe that a
winning streak will usually continue), the inverse\Gambler's
Fallacy" (tendency to believe that after a losing streak, the
next attempt is more likely to be a success) and the related
\Flip Bias"(tendency to believe 0 is likely to be followed by
1 and vice versa) have been thoroughly studied (and shown,
statistically, to be fallacies) [21] [22] [23].
\Flip Bias"was shown to exist in randomness generation
as well [24]. The result extends to digit generation as well.
Figurska et al. showed, in a 2008 study, that humans tend
to choose successive identical digits with probability 7:58%
instead of 10% [25]
3. Therefore it was not surprising that hu-
mans assessed human-generated sequences (created by other
2Humans asked to choose a number between 1 and 10 usually
choose 7. For the range 1 to 20, they usually choose 17 [20].
Similar biases are known for other ranges.
3The study also shows that when humans generate a set of
digits, they choose pairs of the form (a;a+1) and (a;a 1)
with over 32% (expected 18%). This might be a basis for a
generalization of ip bias.
humans asked to generate sequences that they would ex-
pect from multiple coin tosses) as more random than truly-
random sequences, actually generated by coin tosses [26].
An interesting twist in the study of humans and random-
ness emerged when Budescu and Rapoport demonstrated
that under some conditions, namely when participating in
the zero sum competitive game\Matching Pennies"in which
each player chooses a red or black card, the rst player wins
if both players choose a dierent card and the second player
wins if the cards are identical. When playing this game, the
players have an incentive to behave randomly, and human
choices were shown much closer to random than when they
attempt to simulate a random process [27].
It is Only Human to be Biased: While better than
expected, human's gameplay patterns are still not perfectly
random. Eliaz and Rubinstein showed that when playing the
Matching Pennies game, the guesser (a.k.a. seeker) seems to
have a slight empirical advantage over the misleader (a.k.a.
hider) [28]. Specically, guessers had a winning rate of up
to 0:542 (rather than 0:5 expected.)
A more disturbing bias in the context of our work is the
tendency of winning guessers to repeat their choice (60:7%)
and the tendency of winning misleaders to change their choice
after success (57:7%). We remind the reader that this bias
was in a two-choice game, and its extension to an n choice
game is not trivial.
1.4 Goals and Contributions
In this work we present the idea of using human gameplay
as a randomness source for cryptographic purposes. There
are two lines of reasonings behind this idea: (i) The com-
petitive nature of the game may make humans act more
randomly when playing games (than, say, when just asked
to act randomly), as was demonstrated in an experiment by
Rapoport and Budescu [27]. (ii) Playing games is more en-
tertaining to users than simply \supplying entropy", mean-
ing they will probably be willing to participate in the process
and supply more data. A similar reasoning to (ii) was used
by von Ahn who constructed games to motivate people to
perform hard AI tasks and showed that (some) people are
willing to invest much of their time in games [29].
Human game play is not perfectly random and Cryptog-
raphy requires randomness that is very close to uniform
4.
Using randomness extractors (see Section 2) we can get very
good random strings from longer strings that may be biased,
provided they have sucient (min) entropy. This means that
by motivating humans to supply longer sequences, the result
of playing the game, we can improve the randomness of the
result (the fact that they are playing a game means that
they are willing to supply longer sequences than otherwise).
In other words, reason (i) above means that that people
will supply a `better' random string (more entropy per bit)
and reason (ii) means that they will supply a longer string
(overall more entropy).
Not all games are suitable for randomness extraction and
we discuss the properties that games should have in order
to be useful for our purposes. When choosing a game, it is
important that we have an estimate on the quality of ran-
domness humans supply when playing it. We suggested and
4E.g. imagine a onetime pad where is each bit is slightly
biased towards 1, and the same message is repeatedly en-
crypted; a cryptanalyst can easily gure out the message by
taking the majority of each bit position
2implemented a specic game (Hide and Seek) and analyzed
the biases humans show when playing it and checked the
number of good random bits that can be extracted from it.
Once we have good random string of sucient length,
we can generate arbitrarily long pseudo-random sequences,
which are suciently random for Cryptographic use. How-
ever, throughout the lifetime of a system the secret random-
ness may leak or become corrupted. We show how to inte-
grate our randomness extractor from human game play with
a robust PRG system, as suggested by Barak and Halevi
[30] for such purposes; the scheme enjoys `backward' and
`forward' security (see Section 2.3). We implemented a com-
plete system that is independent from the Operating System
and does not require hardware access such as an exact clock,
but rather utilizes only human playing patterns to generate
randomness.
Organization: In Section 2 we give mathematical back-
ground regarding some of the tools we employ: combinato-
rial randomness extractors and cryptographic pseudo-random
generators. In Section 3 we discuss the desired properties
of games used to extract randomness and the challenges in
meeting them. In Section 4 we describe the design and im-
plementation of a specic game and show the feasibility of
extracting sucient randomness from human playing pat-
terns. In Section 5 we describe the integration of the game
with a complete robust PRG system that requires no ran-
domness sources except for game play. In Section 6 we dis-
cuss possible ways to improve the system, other games that
can be use and suggest future work on this topic.
2. PRELIMINARIES
2.1 Randomness Extraction
The earliest discussion of\weak"random sources was prob-
ably made by von Neumann [31] who considered the case of
a biased source that outputs a 0 with probability p and 1
with probability 1   p. In recent times the theory of ran-
domness extractors has been thoroughly investigated and
methods have been found to extract from sources without
a known structure and where the only requirement is high
min-entropy. The discussion below is adapted from the sur-
vey by Shaltiel [32].
Definition 2.1. The min-entropy of a distribution X
on f0;1g
n is dened by:
H1(X) = min
x2f0;1gn log2
1
Pr[X = x]
In other words, if X has min-entropy k, then the probabil-
ity of any single element to be drawn from X is at most
1
2k.
Intuitively, although the distribution is over n bits, it \con-
tains" enough randomness only for k uniformly distributed
bits, meaning we cannot expect to extract more and the
question is how close to k can we obtain.
Definition 2.2. Two distributions P and Q over the same
domain T are statistically "-close if:
1
2
X
x2T
jP(x)   Q(x)j  "
Intuitively, if a distribution is "-close to uniform we can
use it instead of uniform with \damage" of ".
An extractor is a function that takes a biased random
stream and transforms it into a near-uniform random stream.
Formally:
Definition 2.3. A (k;")-extractor is a function
Ext : f0;1g
n  f0;1g
d ! f0;1g
m
such that for every distribution X on f0;1g
n with H1(X) 
k, the distribution Ext(X;s) (where s 2R f0;1g
d, i.e. the
seed s is d bits randomly chosen from the uniform distribu-
tion over f0;1g) is statistically "-close to the uniform dis-
tribution on f0;1g
m.
While extractors can be used in cryptographic systems,
the seed of extraction might become known to the adversary
(such as when the system's randomness is temporarily com-
promised). If the extractor's output is still close to random
even when given the seed, we call the extractor \strong".
Definition 2.4. A (k;")-strong extractor is a function
Ext as above, where the distribution Ext(X;s)  s (where 
represents concatenation) is statistically "-close to the uni-
form distribution on f0;1g
m+d.
Note that using a strong extractor implies that the seed
is reusable. An example of a strong extractor is based on
families of pairwise independent hash functions. In general,
`-wise independent hash functions are functions such that
8x;hs(x) is uniformly distributed over the random choice of
s, and where 8x1;x2;:::x` 2 f0;1g
n the random variables
hs(x1);hs(x2);:::;hsx`) are independent. A construction of
`-wise independent hash functions can be based, for exam-
ple, on random polynomials of degree `   1. The extractor
is dened by the following theorem:
Theorem 2.1. Let H = fhsg be a family of pairwise
independent hash functions hs : f0;1g
n ! f0;1g
m. For
every " > 0 and a randomly chosen seed s, the function
Ext(x;s) = hs(x) is an (m + 2log2
1
";")-strong extractor.
In other words, given a source of n bits with k bits of
min-entropy, for any choice of " > 0, applying a pairwise
independent hash function hs : f0;1g
n ! f0;1g
m where
m = k 2log2
1
" results in m bits that are "-close to random.
2.2 The Barak-Shaltiel-Tromer Model
The classic extraction model assumes that the source dis-
tribution from which extraction is performed is chosen in-
dependently from the extraction seed. However, in some
settings an adversary might have some inuence on the dis-
tribution. For example, in our setting the adversary might
be able to choose which user to attack (dierent users have
dierent biases), and perhaps they also have some limited
inuence on the user's playing patterns.
Such a setting was discussed by Barak, Shaltiel and Tromer
in [33]. Their model allows the extraction procedure to be
resilient against limited adversarial inuence on the entropy
source after the public randomness was chosen and as a func-
tion of it. Similarly to Denition 2.1, we have an extractor
Ext, a seed s and an input x, but the way these elements
are chosen is slightly dierent. The security of the model is
dened by the following process:
1. An adversary chooses 2
t distributions D1;D2;:::;D2t
over f0;1g
n under the constraint that H1(Di) > k for
all 1  i  2
t.
32. A seed s 2 f0;1g
d is chosen at random.
3. The adversary is given s and selects i 2 f1;:::;2
tg.
4. x is drawn from Di and the user computes Exts(x) =
Ext(x;s).
In this setting the denition of t-resilient extraction is:
Definition 2.5. An extractor is called t-resilient (with
parameters ";k;n;m) if for any adversarially chosen 2
t dis-
tributions as above, with probability 1   " over the choice of
the seed s, if X is distributed according to one of the above
Di then Exts(X) is statistically "-close to the uniform dis-
tribution on f0;1g
m.
Barak et al. showed that pairwise independent hash func-
tions are t-resilient extractors with certain parameters, and
that `-wise independent hash functions can achieve even bet-
ter resilience as ` grows. If H = fhsg is a family of `-wise
independent hash functions (we can think of s 2 f0;1g
`n),
then the random seed s species hs and given x 2 f0;1g
n,
the value of the extractor is Es(x) = hs(x). They showed
the following tradeos between t-resilience and the other ex-
traction parameters:
Theorem 2.2. (pairwise independent) For every n;k;m
and ", a pairwise independent hash-function with a seed of
length d = 2n is a t-resilient extractor such that
t =
k   m
2
  2log2(
1
"
)   1
(`-wise independent) For every n;k;m;" and `  2,
an `-wise independent hash-function with a seed of length
d = `n is a t-resilient extractor such that
t =
`
2
(k   m   2log2(
1
"
)   log2 ` + 2)   m   2   log2(
1
"
)
We emphasize that the only requirement for secure ex-
traction in this model, similarly to the classic model, is
high min-entropy. Higher min-entropy immediately implies
higher resilience.
2.3 Pseudo-Random Generators
A Cryptographic Pseudo-Random Generator is a
computable function that, given a random seed, creates a
longer pseudo-random sequence. More formally, a PRG is
a deterministic polynomial time function G : f0;1g
m !
f0;1g
n where n > m so that for all Probabilistic Polynomial-
Time algorithm A, x 2R f0;1g
m and y 2R f0;1g
n, the dif-
ference jProb(A(G(x)) = 1) Prob(A(y) = 1)j is negligible
5.
PRGs are extremely important in Cryptography, as they
imply that a relatively short random seed can supply all the
randomness needed for a system without signicant security
loss relative to a one-time pad.
While a PRG can be used to expand a short random se-
quence into a longer sequence, there are still considerable se-
curity vulnerabilities for real PRG systems. If an adversary
manages to retrieve the seed used to generate the sequence,
the entire sequence becomes predictable. Even partial in-
formation about the seed could be used by an adversary
to perform educated guesses, and even short pieces of the
generated pseudo-randomness could be used to verify these
guesses.
5A function f(n) is said to be negligible if 8poly() 9n0 such
that 8n > n0;f(n) <
1
poly(n). In other words, the inverse of
the function grows faster than any polynomial.
The Barak-Halevi Robust PRG
In order to address this problem, Barak and Halevi intro-
duced the concept of a Robust Pseudo-Random Gen-
erator [30]. A robust PRG, as they dened it, is a system
that is similar to a PRG with an input function refresh() that
refreshes its entropy, and an output function next() that re-
turns a pseudo-random sequence. A robust PRG fullls the
following properties:
Forward security: assume the adversary learns the inter-
nal state of the system at a certain point in time.
The past outputs of the system generated prior to the
break-in, should still be indistinguishable from random
to the adversary (naturally, this means the past states
should not be reconstructable).
Backward security (break-in recovery): assume the ad-
versary learns the current state S. Following the next
\refresh"(after the break-in), all outputs should be in-
distinguishable from random to that adversary.
Immunity to adversarial entropy: assume the adversary
gains complete control over the refresh entropy (but
has no knowledge of the internal state of the system
which has been previously refreshed). The output of
the system should still be indistinguishable from a ran-
dom sequence to that adversary.
A major advantage of robust PRGs is the ability to com-
bine independent sources of entropy for a proven increase in
security. This possibility can also be seen as a motivation
for the current work and for nding other sources of entropy
as dierent as possible from those in use today.
Barak and Halevi construct a provably robust PRG from
any cryptographically secure PRG G. The system has an
internal (secret) state Si 2 f0;1g
m. On request for next(),
the system runs a PRG G : f0;1g
m ! f0;1g
2m on S. One
half of the result becomes the new state Si+1, and the other
half is returned as a pseudo-random bit sequence. Upon
refresh(), the system takes m bits of extracted entropy and
applies XOR of the current state Si with it. The result is
then processed by G, and one half of the result is set as the
new state Si+1. We use this in Section 5.
3. EXTRACTION FROM HUMANS
In the previous section we established that given a good
(high min-entropy) short sequence, we can generate very
long Pseudo-Random sequences. We also saw that given
several dierent entropy sources, we can combine them for
an even safer system.
In this section we analyze the settings in which human
game play could be used as an entropy source,
3.1 Games Used for Extraction: Desiderata
In Section 2.1, when discussing Randomness Extractors,
we saw that the amount of randomness that can be extracted
from a source is bounded by its min-entropy. Therefore,
if we want to extract randomness from a human's playing
patterns in a game, we want two major criteria to hold:
1. The game encourages humans playing it to use high
min-entropy.
42. There exists a method to bound from below the min-
entropy used by the player in an observed interaction,
i.e. to recognize very low-entropy play when it is ob-
served.
Regarding the rst requirement, it is obvious that in or-
der for the player's actions in the game to have large min-
entropy, the player must have many options for each move
(the number of possible moves and the number of \rounds"
together bound the min-entropy from above). Also, we
would want the players to have no reason to prefer specic
moves over others, nor to prefer specic sequences of moves
(i.e. have dependencies between the moves). We saw in Sec-
tion 1.3 that human biases are increased when the mixed
strategy is not uniform. Non-uniform mixed strategies are
unnatural, and the higher bound for the min-entropy used
by the players is lower. Therefore, we would prefer games
with perfect (uniform) mixed strategy.
Regarding the second requirement, although we can deal
with human biases to some extent (as discussed in Section
1.4), the guarantees on the quality of the results requires a
bound on the min-entropy used by the player. An attempt
to estimate the min-entropy of humans empirically is done
in Section 4 and a suggestion for future work on the subject
is given in Section 6.3.
In addition to the desired properties regarding min-entropy,
there are also desired technical properties of such a game.
The game should be reasonably short, so that players would
not become annoyed and bored with playing it periodically.
It also should be natural to play and not require extensive
skills from the players, so that it could be used by people
who do not usually play video games. In addition, the game
should work on the most minimal of computing systems, and
require no expensive or large hardware (e.g. high resolution
screen or a fast processor). Not less important, the game
should be at least somewhat interesting and entertain play-
ers long enough so that they will willingly play enough to
produce many sequences. If the game is not entertaining,
the player might become bored and resort to a\lets just get
it over with" approach that might increase repetition and
lower the entropy of the provided sequences.
On Games with Deterministic Strategies:. While game
theory often discusses games with mixed strategy, most recre-
ational games actually played by people have a deterministic
optimal strategy, i.e. a nite sequence of moves that prevents
losing in the game, or in the case of randomness based games
(such as Backgammon or Monopoly), minimize the risk of
losing
6. This includes two-player games such as Checkers
7,
as well as single-player video games such as Pacman
8 or Su-
per Mario. These games rely on the player's skill in nding
and performing winning sequences.
Games with an optimal strategy are obviously less useful
for entropy extraction. Players often learn the basics of a
game quickly and devise some basic templates that they use
6A near-optimal almost deterministic strategy for a certain
Poker variant can be found in [34]
7In Checkers, perfect play by both players leads to a draw
[35]. Thus, an optimal strategy for winning the game does
not exist.
8An optimal strategy for the original Pacman game
can be found at http://www.geocities.com/mamehelp/pac-
man.html
throughout the game. Nonetheless, it is still possible to
extract little entropy from such game play by concentrating
on least-signicant behavior (i.e. low order bits). The exact
position of a mouse cursor or the exact millisecond timing of
clicks are not crucial to the success of the player in the game.
Mixed Strategy is therefore not mandatory for extracting
randomness.
3.2 Fitting a Game to the Desiderata
Consider the mixed strategy zero-sum game studied by
Rapoport and Budescu in [27], Matching Pennies. The ma-
jor problem with this game is that in each round the player
faces only two options. This is very bad for our purposes, as
a player produces at most one independent bit per round
9.
Modern Cryptographic keys, such as the ones used by AES
are at least 128 bits long. Therefore, at least 128 rounds of
this game need to be played in order to create a single key,
making this game inecient for our purposes.
A natural extension of Matching Pennies that enlarges the
number of choices per move is the game Hide and Seek
[36] [37]. In the classic version of Hide and Seek, one player
(the hider) chooses a spot on a vector or grid (usually two-
dimensional, but not necessarily) with n cells. The second
player (the seeker) also chooses a spot on the same grid.
The hider wins a point if the seeker chose a dierent cell,
and the seeker wins a point if they both chose the same
cell. Similar to Matching Pennies, the game is also a two
player zero-sum perfect mixed strategy game. Assuming
(very optimistically) that a player is perfectly random, for
each choice in this grid they \generate" log2 n bits. Unless
the grid is very large, one such game does not supply su-
cient entropy for cryptographic uses
10 In order to solve this,
the game can be played over several rounds, until enough en-
tropy was gathered. The methods to determine this amount
is analyzed further in the next section.
An important observation is that, similarly to Matching
Pennies, if the hider's min-entropy is low, then he will lose
more rounds than expected at least against an omnipotent
adversary who knows their strategy. This is because the
seeker will be able to use the patterns in the hider's play
and gain an advantage, so in the long run they will be pun-
ished for their low min-entropy.
The main challenge when attempting to construct a game
to t the desired properties is that while it should encour-
age people to play randomly, it should also be fun enough to
play such that the players retain their interest and play long
enough to produce enough entropy. These two properties are
somewhat contradictory, as playing randomly does not nor-
mally appeal to humans. Popular recreational games usually
challenge players to play accurately, which is in some sense
the exact opposite of random play. In Section 4 we try to
address this challenge as we design and implement a variant
of \Hide and Seek".
Since the game is going to be used by a system that does
not really know the user's strategy (and hence it is hard to
argue that low min entropy implies low points) we also need
to employ some system of trying to learn patterns in the
user's play and to punish for ones that lower the entropy.
9Since humans are still not perfectly random, the real
amount of entropy that can be extracted from this game
is even smaller.
10Even if the player is perfectly random, n would need to be
at least 2
128, which is of course impractical.
53.3 Simulating One Player by the Computer
Rapoport and Budescu [27] conducted their experiment
on sets of two players, showing that game playing induces
relatively random behavior. However, the systems for which
we envision the game to be played in order to generate ran-
domness are private (e.g. a PDA), meaning that two players
are not always available (and even if they are there is the
issue of ensuring that the communication between them re-
mains secret, since the adversary might be eavesdropping
on it). This naturally raises the scenario in which we sim-
ulate one of the players in the game by the computer. The
human player should be able to play as if their opponent
is human, as humans often do when they play single-player
games against computer opponents.
In such a setting, the computer player should not be too
predictable. If the human player is able to predict the com-
puter player's behavior in advance, this would make the hu-
man playing patterns somewhat predictable and the human
bored. We nd ourselves forced to make its moves at least
somewhat random, and this means that we need to \waste"
some of our randomness.
An important point is that this randomness used by the
computer player doesn't need to be so good. Rather, it
should only be unpredictable enough to fool the human player
who is naturally limited both computationally and in the
information they have about the system. Any move pattern
that is not trivial to detect is sucient (but, of course, not
to a malicious adversary who might be more sophisticated).
A critical observation is that since the human generates ran-
domness for their own system we assumed that they are not
malicious meaning they will not play predictable patterns
on purpose. We address the issue of malicious adversaries
who gain temporary access to the system in the construction
in Section 5.
In the case of weak computers that lack an entropy source,
(no internal clock and no hard disk), some factory dened
\randomness" could be pre-programmed into the machine,
and later supplemented by small amounts of the human-
extracted entropy when it is gathered.
Since the single-player setting is a very useful scenario
(and apparently also the most challenging), we will concen-
trate on it throughout this work.
4. OF MICE AND ELEPHANTS
In this section we suggest a game suitable for randomness
extraction and test the ability of humans to play it with
high min-entropy. We then show the feasibility of extracting
from the playing patterns sucient randomness for common
cryptographic applications.
4.1 Constructing a High Entropy Game
Following the discussion in Section 3.2, we chose the game
\Hide and Seek" as the basis for our experiment. In the
design of our variant, we attempted to satisfy the desiderata
(Section 3.1), i.e. we try to implement an entertaining game
that encourages players to play randomly.
A problematic aspect of the Hide and Seek game is that
similarly to Matching Pennies, it does not seem to be very
entertaining
11. In order to make this game more interest-
11When conducting their experiment Rapoport and Budescu
paid 91 test subjects to play Matching Pennies, as customary
in Social Sciences.
ing and enjoyable so that humans will want to play it for
the required length of time, we used lively mouse and ele-
phant characters, we renamed it \Mice and Elephant" and
incorporated animations and sound eects.
Instead of having discrete choices over a set of cells, the
players choose a position in a seemingly continuous board.
In the implementation the board is of course discrete, slightly
larger than 512  256 pixels. This ts the screen nicely in
any commonly used screen resolution, as well as produces
approximately 9 + 8 = 17 bits of raw data per click (note
that human behavior in the game is not uniform, so the real
randomness extracted from it will be smaller). Humans are
not very accurate in their click positions, so the high-level
entropy from the human choices is mixed with the low-level
entropy from their inaccuracy.
In each round, the hider positions the mice on the grass
and the seeker positions the elephant. After both players are
done, a short animation sequence shows the elephant falling
on the spot where it was placed. The game ends when the
seeker's elephant \crashes" one of the hider's mice (i.e. it is
positioned close enough to it). This brutal immediate end
of the game encourages the player to play carefully, as well
as adds an element of suspense. The animation makes the
purpose of the game quite clear, even if the user did not read
the instructions.
In our implementation, the mice are controlled by the hu-
man player (hider). The elephant is controlled by the com-
puter player (seeker). We let the hider control r mice (where
r is the round number), while the seeker controls a single ele-
phant
12. The objective of the hider is to survive as many
rounds as possible, while the objective of the seeker is to
catch a mouse as early as possible, ending the game.
The progression in the number of mice was chosen mainly
in order to make the game more interesting. Many rounds
of one mouse vs. one elephant would quickly bore the play-
ers - when all rounds feel the same, there is no feeling of
advancing. The increasing probability for losing in each
round builds up even more tension in the game, especially
when the player approaches his previous highest round (For
a discussion of this \Narrative Tension" and other consider-
ations in game design, see [38]). An important eect of this
choice is that it allows good players to introduce more en-
tropy into the system - a more random player will generally
reach higher rounds (as the opponent will nd it harder to
predict their behavior).
A problem immediately evident in the game as dened is
that the best strategy is placing all mice in the same spot.
Since the game ends when any mouse is hit and this strategy
minimizes the chance of a mouse being caught. In order to
prevent players from using this strategy, we prevent mice
from being positioned too close to each other. While this
slightly lowers our entropy gathering, it prevents the lazy
strategy which might have very bad impact.
Another problem is players who use the natural tactic
of repeating the same moves over and over from round to
round. A simple solution was having the elephant, with high
probability, choose its moves uniformly from the player's re-
cent history of moves (once the player builds such a history,
before that the moves are always random). This ensures that
playing a certain region too often would cause the player to
12Note that using more than one mouse per round does not
promise an increase in the min-entropy needed to avoid the
elephant.
6be caught faster. Another deterrent to any regional bias
a player might have was added in the form of obstacles,
marked areas where mice cannot be positioned. The sys-
tem introduces several obstacles to the playing eld that
graphically convey to the player that a mouse cannot be
positioned there: A big rock, a lava pit, a shark pool or a
mousetrap. Similarly to the elephant's moves, the positions
of the obstacles are chosen uniformly from the player's pre-
vious moves. If players choose a certain region more often,
this region would be more likely to be blocked by an obsta-
cle. In the long run, this technique pushes the distribution
towards uniform. Figure 1 shows the game as given in the
nal version.
Figure 1: Mice and Elephant with Obstacles
In order to allow the players to follow their advancement
in entropy gathering, the players are given a score for each
mouse, the number of obstacles (to compensate for the low-
ered number of options), the distance from the elephant and
the time. The time bonus was mainly introduced to prevent
the players from carefully planning patterns while position-
ing mice. In addition, Fitts' law (see [39]) predicts that the
accuracy of clicks lowers when users have less time, which is
to our advantage in this setting (accuracy is, in a sense, the
opposite of randomness).
In the context of randomness extraction, it appears natu-
ral to demand that the player reaches a certain score before
considering the entropy sucient (see Section 5 for an anal-
ysis). Apart from ensuring the minimal amount of entropy
sucient for completely refreshing the system, having such
a goal in mind should also make playing the game more in-
teresting (A goal is perhaps the most important principle in
a game, see [38]).
4.2 Experimental Setting
In order to test the typical human behavior in the game,
we developed a web based game using Java 1:5, and pub-
licized it at rst to students in our department and later
to the internet. The game is available for download at the
authors' website.
The experiment ran online for several weeks during which
it was advertised on various internet forums, to friends and
family, and in several academic gatherings.
It is important to note that most subjects were not aware
of our objective, and were only instructed to attempt to mis-
lead their opponent and survive as many rounds as possible.
4.3 Results Analysis
The map of all clicks played in the game by all 482 players
are shown in Figures 2 and 3. The fact that these results
are from many users (each contributing a dierent amount
of data) makes it dicult to claim that this is the actually
representation of a person's playing pattern. While there is
too little data for analyzing individual players' patterns, we
can still gain some insights from these results in regards to
how humans play this game. In a sense, the Barak-Shaltiel-
Tromer model justies this approach, as it incorporates re-
silience to adversary inuence (discussed in Section 2.2). Ex-
cept, perhaps, for some extreme cases of incompetent users
with very low min-entropy in their playing patterns, the re-
sult of extraction remains almost-uniform. This is true even
when the adversary knows or aects some of the biases of
the chosen user.
Figure 2: Click map over 24;008 clicks by 482 users
in the nal game
Figure 3: Estimated distribution over 24;008 clicks
by 482 users in the nal game
The results depict a high inclination for the corners and
banks of the eld
13, but in general the distribution is not far
from uniform. Perhaps the most important result is the fact
that the most highly represented single point in the playing
13This is interestingly opposite to Rubinstein, Tversky and
Heller's result for a four-cell Hide and Seek game, where
players tended to avoid the endpoints [37]. A possible ex-
planation that resolves this conict in results would be that
players perform a binary mental choice between \edge" or
\not edge", and in our setting the amount of space that is
perceived as an edge or corner is much smaller than in their
experiment (where it is actually 50% of given options). The
size of this mental \edge" is an interesting topic in itself.
7eld has only 7 clicks out of 24;008 total clicks. This gives
us an upper bound on the min-entropy of 11:74 per click.
If all clicks were completely independent, this would have
been a good estimate of the min-entropy.
Nonetheless, there are good reasons to believe clicks are
very much not independent. It is reasonable to assume
that humans employ some strategy between clicks, especially
within a single round, where the mice are all visible on the
screen as the same time. In order to test this, we visual-
ize the dierences between each click and the next click in
Figure 4.
Figure 4: Click dierence map over 24;008 clicks
(logarithmic scale)
The under-represented ellipse in the center of the map
is the region where a click cannot be played (in the same
round) nearby a previous click. Some clicks still exist in
the range because the dierence was measured also between
rounds.
It is noticeable that players have a tendency to click very
close to the previous click. In the central rectangle of size
109217 (which accounts for less than 4:1% of the complete
map, and includes the central ellipse) there are 9145 clicks,
accounting for over 40% of the clicks in the map. Also notice
that players prefer playing on the same axis as the previous
click, either left, right, up or down from a previous click. In
the highly represented part on the left of the ellipse there
is a rectangle of size 31  36 pixels (0:19% of the map) in
which 1928 clicks have been introduced (more than 8% of
clicks).
An important observation is that the maximal point rep-
resented in the map is 24 (out of 24;007). This gives us an
upper bound on the min-entropy of 9:96 per click, lower than
the bound found on the click map. If we assume each click
made in the game is dependent only on the previous click
(i.e. that the process is Markovian), this could be a good
estimate for the min-entropy per click, as the dierence bias
is much more dominant.
The second (see gure 5) and third degree dierence were
also tested (given a click, the second order dierence is the
dierence between a click and a click performed two clicks
ago). The results were similar, but signicantly less biased
than the rst order dierence.
4.4 Statistical Result Analysis
The raw results as taken from the human play were con-
catenated to a single bit-string, ordered by users rst and
time later. On these results we ran a pattern distribution
test We chose this randomness test mostly because it was
used by Rapoport and Budescu to compare the statistical
Figure 5: 2nd order Click dierence map over 24;008
clicks (logarithmic scale)
randomness in humans' playing pattern versus humans' at-
tempts to generate random sequences in [27], and this anal-
ysis gives contrast to their results.
After taking the binary representation of the click lo-
cations and applying a 2-wise independent hash function
(Multiplication in GF(2
n)) as an extractor (see Def. 2.4).
The extractor was applied on sequential tuples of 39 clicks
(3917 = 663 bits) and a target size of m = 128 bits. Accord-
ing to Theorem 2.1, the results should be about 2
 128-close
to uniform (without resilience), of course based on the as-
sumption that the min-entropy of the data is 9:9 per click.
The result was consistently (throughout ve dierent ran-
dom seed choices) good p-values (all under 0.95).
We should note that the subjects of this study were not
instructed to play randomly, and some instruction on the
matter could improve results even further, as discussed in
Section 1.3.
5. A COMPLETE SYSTEM
5.1 Overview of the Proposed System
In this section we suggest a construction of a robust Pseudo-
Random Generator based on human game play, that requires
no other entropy source. The system is comprised of three
major parts:
1. The game constructed in Section 4.
2. The extractor discussed in Section 2.2.
3. The Barak-Halevi Robust PRG discussed in Section
2.3.
The Barak-Halevi architecture is the skeleton of this sys-
tem and the entropy source for it is the moves played in the
game. The extractor used on this entropy is an `-wise inde-
pendent hash function with at factory set random seed. The
user should apply the refresh() function periodically (e.g.
daily, weekly or after a potentially compromising event).
The user then plays the game, and when the system detects
that sucient entropy has been gathered, new randomness
is extracted from the user's gameplay. When requested, the
system generates pseudo-random sequences for the user (us-
ing the next() function).
The system is started with some initial value as the in-
ternal state. The refresh() and next() operations utilize a
cryptographic PRG implemented by using AES on some ar-
bitrary value with the current state set as the key.
8Using the Barak-Halevi framework guarantees us forward
security, backward security and immunity to adversarial en-
tropy, and the ability to predict entropy is tied to the ability
to nd an AES key.
5.2 The Detailed Construction
In this section we suggest parameter values for this sys-
tem that t current security practices and technologies. The
rst major choice is the block and state size (which deter-
mines the output size). For this, we chose 128 bits, which is
sucient for modern security requirements and ts modern
cryptographic needs. The system is imprinted with several
factory generated random sequences:
 s 2 f0;1g
15;232 - The seed used for randomness extrac-
tion, must be chosen randomly. The value was chosen
to suce to extract using an ` = 32-wise independent
hash function, from blocks of 28 clicks or 476 bits.
 s;n 2 f0;1g
128 - The constants used together as
input to the PRG where the seed is the secret state.
These values can theoretically be set to any arbitrary
values such as 0 and 1, but random values add a layer
of obscurity.
 S0 2 f0;1g
128 - The initial state of the system. Can
theoretically be set to any arbitrary value such as 0,
but a random value adds a layer of obscurity.
These sequences can all be public without hurting the sys-
tem's security. Their sizes were chosen as they require less
than 2 kilobytes of memory, which is a reasonable amount
even for weak machines. This settings allows generation of
independent outputs of 128 bits, long enough for most cryp-
tographic uses. Of course, repeated uses of next() allows
users to get strings of any length, should the need arise.
The internal state is initially set to S0. In order to start
using the system, the user needs to refresh it at least once
by playing enough rounds of the game. When at least 28
good clicks have been played (80;000 points are enough to
guarantee this with high probability), under the assumption
that the min-entropy of the user is indeed 9:9 per click, this
would ensure that a sequence with 277 bits of min-entropy
are ready for extraction.
All data generated by the user is passed via an 32-wise
independent hash function (as discussed in Section 2.2) with
the seed s. The result is an m = 128 bit sequence. Under the
assumption that the min-entropy is 9:9 and using Theorem
2.2, this sequence result is 2
 64-close to uniform with t = 46
adversary resilience.
At this point, the sequence is XORed with the current
state S, and the result is given as the key to a block cipher
implementation (AES is probably the best choice at the time
of writing this) that encrypts s to get the new state.
After the system is set, it may be used to generate outputs.
This is done by sending the current state as the key of a
block cipher that encrypts n and returns the result as the
output. The state is then immediately refreshed by sending
it as a key to a block cipher that encrypts s.
5.3 Adapting to Incompetent Players
Under the assumption that the only signicant biases a
human user has are the click locations and dierences, the
min-entropy can be estimated for the specic user by analyz-
ing their clicks and dierences patterns. In order to assess
the min-entropy, we can use a low-level lter on the click
map and dierence map, and check the maximal values in
the maps. This allows to easily identify highly expressed re-
gions or dierences, in which case the estimated min-entropy
would be lowered. If the min-entropy is estimated to be too
low, the program can increase the amount of moves needed
before generating the output, directly dependent upon The-
orem 2.2. As the required entropy for refresh grows, the ex-
traction rate is lowered, but security is never compromised.
5.4 Performance Analysis
In order to test the performance of the complete Human-
Random Generator, we implemented a slightly simplied
system using Java 1:5. S0 was set to zero, z was not used,
and extraction was done with a pairwise independent hash
function, with a seed being a sequence arbitrarily chosen
from [40]. Also, the number of mice per round was decreased
to b1 +
r
2c to prevent clutter.
Since the system uses only a pairwise independent hash
function as an extractor, we require that the players reach
80;000 points which ensure that at least 28 clicks have been
played. In this extreme case where k = 28  9:9 = 277, the
results are approximately 2
 32-close to random with t = 9
resilience. In practice, between 40 and 50 clicks have usually
been played to achieve this score. With an average k =
45  9:9 = 445, the results should be about 2
 64 close to
random with t = 29 resilience.
The implemented system is available for download at the
authors' website.
The system GUI is shown in Figure 6.
Figure 6: PRG System GUI - The user presses next
as many times as desired to generate output strings.
As a second phase, we proceeded to test the randomness
of this system by simulating it over long-term activation.
We begin by initiating the internal state with a refresh() on
a block of 128 bits extracted from the experiment results
from Section 4.3. Similarly to the analysis in Section 4.4,
extraction was made from blocks of 39 clicks from the ex-
periment. According to Theorem 2.1, the results should be
about 2
 128-close to random (without resilience).
The system then generated 10;240 sequential calls to next(),
saving the resulting outputs sequentially into a le. The
system was then refreshed with another block of human-
extracted entropy. This pattern is repeated until there is no
more source entropy. The extraction procedure resulted in
slightly more than 64;000 bits, so we refreshed 500 times,
and ended up with a result le of 614;400;000 bits. We
9tested this le using the DIEHARD statistical suite of tests
[41] and found no signicant statistical biases.
5.5 Combining Different Entropy Sources
A main advantage of the system constructed in this sec-
tion, an inherent advantage of the Barak-Halevi architecture
used, is that it can utilize several dierent entropy sources.
The system is promised to be secure if at least one entropy
source used is secure, and therefore using as many dier-
ent entropy sources as possible can never harm security, but
only increase it.
For example, one can consider initiating the system with
an internal state derived from the system's constants (or in a
PDA setting, perhaps a single long random code generated
in the factory), and then refresh the system with human-
extracted entropy periodically. A more complex combina-
tion could add an entropy gathering system in the back-
ground (similar to the systems mentioned in Section 1.2).
The ongoing entropy gathering would be used to refresh the
system in short intervals (e.g. minutes) while explicit ex-
traction from the user via the game could be used in longer
intervals (e.g. days).
6. CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER WORK
In this work, we designed and implemented a game and
analyzed the playing patterns of people who played it. Many
people participated, implying that the game was reasonable
to play, e.g. not very dicult to understand. We saw that
randomness extraction from this game is feasible, and that
the randomness is enough to be used by a Pseudo-Random
Generator with good empirical results. The option to com-
bine this randomness with other entropy sources strengthens
this result even more.
The main conclusion is that using human game play as a
randomness source is a valid option, whether by itself when
other forms of randomness are not possible. The possibility
of combining this randomness with other entropy sources
(see Section 5.5) makes this approach even more attractive.
6.1 Comparison With Direct Gathering
As mentioned in Section 1.4, one motivation of this work
was that the competitive nature of games provokes humans
to be more random. A natural question is then to see how
signicant is the game setting as opposed to, say, just ask-
ing users directly to click at random locations. Ideally, to
establish the benets of entropy gathering in a competitive
setting, an experiment should be done to compare the results
when playing the game and when requesting clicks directly
from the user.
We actually attempted to conduct a similar experiment to
the one in Section 4 and compare the biases in gameplay to
the biases when directly asking for clicks (on an otherwise
similar setting to the game and with the same restrictions).
However, we had too few participants (around 50) who all
played too little to provide us with meaningful results (they
did not generate enough `clicks' to allow extraction). This
lack of motivation to participate in itself says something
about the problems of direct gathering. Participants who
were interviewed about their experience all said they re-
sorted to some pattern, usually circles around the center,
and attempted to \get it over with" as fast as possible.
This experience implies that it is worth studying the be-
havior of people in a more controlled environment as well
(as opposed to just having the game on the web).
6.2 Dynamic Score Model and Obstacles
After observing the behavior of the players in Section 4.3
we reached the conclusion that the game can be improved
to encourage more random game play. Since the rst or-
der dierence contained a dominant bias, it is natural that
we would want to counter it. One possible measure is to
tweak the score model such that players who position mice
in the highly represented areas, i.e. very close to a previous
mouse or on the same X-axis or Y-axis, are punished by be-
ing awarded signicantly lower scores, or even lose points.
The reward for reaction speed might have encouraged play-
ers to play quickly and thus not move far enough, leading
to the bias observed in the rst order dierence maps, so
it remains to be tested how this aects the quality of the
results (see Section 6.3).
A dynamic scoring process could be automated by super-
imposing the inverse of the cumulative click map and the
dierence maps as the score model. In eect, clicking a less
common region or following a less common pattern would re-
sult in a higher score reversely proportional to the popularity
of the point clicked. If the system is used by a single user,
this model would encourage the user to be creative. Also,
if the user is too repetitive and gains low score, the system
would require more game play before refreshing. Consid-
ering the players' inability to be accurate, a low-pass lter
(blur) of the cumulative click map could be used instead of
the map itself, to promote playing less played areas. Leav-
ing the users to learn the score model on their own is an
additional challenge: The player might experiment to nd
the sort of behaviors that will grant them a higher score.
Similarly to the dynamic score mode, some form of dy-
namic obstacles can also be utilized. For example, when the
player positions a mouse, the rst order dierence map for
the user can be used to randomly position an obstacle rel-
ative to the user's last move. This could further assist in
'attening' the playing patterns to being more uniform.
6.3 Additional Work
We suggest several directions for further research on this
topic and related topics:
Dierent Games: In this work we studied a single game.
Obviously, this is not the only possible game for our pur-
poses and there are many other games that can be used. An
interesting issue is trying to characterize the design rules
that make people behave randomly (i.e with sucient min
entropy).
Note that a complete system might include a set of dier-
ent games that the user may choose to play. The option of
dierent games would make the user more entertained. One
possible direction for more games is extensions of hide and
seek such as Battleship, but it also possible to use very dif-
ferent games, including games where the optimal strategy is
not necessarily not mixed strategy (see section 3.1). A bene-
t of using such games is that we can choose an already pop-
ular game to collect entropy from, a game that is proven to
attract players to play more. Analyzing the min-entropy for
popular games, such as Tetris (which is specically interest-
ing because it is not deterministic), could prove interesting
and useful.
A dierent direction to study is cooperative games. While
in this work we only discussed competitive games, it is pos-
10sible to create cooperative version of Hide and Seek, where
choosing a dierent spot than the second player gives both
players a higher score
14. We also consider a cooperative
game called the anti-ESP game
15, in which the two players
choose an image or subset of images from a large set, and
are rewarded for the dierence in their choices. The inher-
ent problem with cooperative games is that players wish to
\communicate"a strategy to the other player, and therefore
have an incentive to be predictable.
Accelerometer Games: While PDAs typically lack a
moving hard disk or other common entropy generating parts,
they do present other devices and opportunities for entropy
gathering: for instance, some models include an accelerom-
eter which measures movement of the device in space. This
device has already been identied as a good entropy source
due to its high sensitivity
16. Games can be used to provoke
players to play with the accelerometer (i.e. move the de-
vice in space) allowing the device to gather much entropy.
The iPhone comes equipped with accelerometer based games
such as Labyrinth which can easily be adapted to digest play-
ing patterns into a PRG
17. Other input devices such as mi-
crophones and cameras raise many interesting possibilities
for incorporations with games.
Dierent Populations: In the study performed in Sec-
tion 4 we had no knowledge or control of the subjects in-
volved, as it was completely anonymous. The dierence
of behaviors between dierent types of populations might
change our key observations regarding the min-entropy of
play. Some possible populations to compare could be older
people vs. younger people, casual gamers vs.\heavy"gamers
vs. non-gamers, males vs. females, and dierent cultures or
countries.
Complete System Test: Our study of human playing
patterns was done without a score threshold, but in our
implementation the user knows when they are approaching
the threshold of points. This knowledge and other factors
could skew user behavior. Therefore, the system should be
tested in its nal version, over long term usage.
It is especially interesting to see whether users can main-
tain their interest in the game and provide sucient entropy
over extended periods, especially if required to do so peri-
odically.
Human Accuracy and Fitts' law: Fitts' law predicts
the time it will take a human to move a pointer to a tar-
get area as a function of the distance to the target and the
size of the target area (see [39]). It is often considered a
good measure of the human speed-accuracy tradeo (see,
for example, [43]). By bounding the time we give a user to
perform a task we therefore may predict that the accuracy
of the click position would be damaged. If we consider ran-
14To a large extent, whether a game is cooperative of com-
petitive is in the eye of the beholder and the way the game
is framed.
15In the ESP game suggested by von Ahn and Dabbish in
[42] two players attempt to agree on words that represent an
image (without knowing each other's guesses until a match
is found).
16There is a software called\keyshaker"for iPhones that ad-
vertises that it uses the Accelerometer for generating ran-
domness that and there are proposals for using the ac-
celerometer for pairing (creating a common key) two devices
[14, 15].
17We would like to thank the anonymous referee who pointed
us to the use of accelerometers as entropy sources
domness as the opposite of accuracy, Fitts' law gives us an
estimate on the randomness generated by a human in a click
task. We can use it as a basis to study the entropy of clicks
against dierent time constraints and distances and derive
estimated lower bounds on the entropy of human actions
when performing certain tasks.
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